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During the 1981 legislative session, a joint legislative committee
was created to study "the need for and feasibility of developing a
specific procedure for the partition of community property between
spouses, and settlement of debts and claims for reimbursement upon
dissolution of the community regime for any cause."1 The product of
that joint legislative committee was enacted during the 1982 legislative
session.!
Article 2369.1 of the Civil Code3 was repealed by the 1982 legisla-
tion, and its substance was replaced by Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2801. Enacted in 1981, article 2369.1 authorized the judge to parti-
tion in kind property of the community "by the allocation of assets
and liabilities of equal net value to each spouse." Prior to the enact-
ment of article 2369.1, Louisiana courts utilized the "item theory" of
partition in kind, rather than the "aggregate theory."' Under the "item
theory" of partition in kind, it was necessary that each particular com-
munity effect be capable of division between the spouses. Normally,
community property consists of different assets not capable of "item
by item" division in kind. In contrast, under the more flexible "ag-
gregate theory," different assets of equal value are allotted to each
spouse, provided that the property each ultimately receives is of equal
net value. Article 2369.1 adopted for Louisiana the "aggregate theory"
of partition in kind, utilized by the other seven community property
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1. La. S. Con. Res. No. 165, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
2. 1982 La. Acts, No. 439.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.1 (repealed by 1982 La. Acts, No. 439):
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of the community, either
spouse may obtain a judgment decreeing a partition of the community in kind
by allocation of assets and liabilities of equal net value to each spouse. If the
community or any part thereof cannot be conveniently divided, the court shall
order partition by licitation.
4: See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
444-45 (1975); K. Rigby, Some Views, Old and New, on Recent Developments in Family
Law-Partitioning the Community, 29 LA. B.J. 232, 235 (1982); Note, Termination of the
Community, 42 LA. L. REV. 789, 811-16 (1982).
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states.' Under article 2369.1, the judge had authority to partition com-
munity property in kind even when the property was indivisible by
nature. Thus, the undesirable alternative of a partition by licitation,6
which previously had been the only other option,7 was avoided.
No provision was made in article 2369.1 "for how assets [were]
to be allocated between the spouses;"' the article only provided that
the allocation was to achieve equal net value. To the contrary, Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 9:2801 provides in detail the procedure for a
judicial partition of community property, an order of priority, and
guidelines to be followed in the allocation of assets and liabilities.
Clearly, the purpose of the order of priority is that partitions by licita-
tion, requiring the property to be sold at public auction, be a last
resort.
Procedurally, the new legislation is peculiarly suited to the nature
of a partition of community property, which may include numerous
assets rather than a single co-owned item. For example, as a part
of the proceedings to partition the community property, the court is
authorized to settle the claims of the spouses, which may include
claims for reimbursement, 9 an accounting," or damages for fraud or
bad faith in the management of community property."
When proceedings are instituted, each party is required to file
a sworn detailed descriptive list of the community property, its fair
market value, and its location. 2 Each party either traverses or con-
5. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 4, at 464. The other seven community
property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington.
6. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1339 & 1340.
7. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1337, 1339, 1340; LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4606. See also
Wyche v. Taylor, 191 La. 891, 186 So. 602 (1939); Dhuet v. Taylor, 383 So. 2d 1061
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), discussed in Note, supra note 4, at 814.
8. Note, supra note 4, at 814. Methods suggested by the author that should or
should not have been used by the courts in the allocation of assets and liabilities under
Civil Code article 2369.1 included the possibility of ordering the payment of an equalizing
sum of money and the inappropriateness of a partition by lots under Civil Code ar-
ticles 1364-1367. Id. at 814-15.
9. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2364-2368.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2354.
12. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added):
Each party shall affirm under oath that the detailed descriptive list filed by that
party contains all of the community assets and liabilities then known to that party.
Amendments to the descriptive lists shall be permitted .... Upon motion of either
party, the court shall set a time limit for the filing of each detailed descriptive list.
Presumably, in fixing a time limit, the court should consider the particular circumstances
of the case, including the amount of assets and liabilities, the complexity involved
in determining the classification of assets and their value, and the lack of knowledge
of a spouse concerning community assets and liabilities.
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curs in the inclusion or exclusion of each asset (and its valuation) and
liability in the descriptive list of, the other party.'" Such a require-
ment assists the court, the parties, and their attorneys in identifying
what items are in dispute. The trial of the traverses may be by sum-
mary procedure or by ordinary procedure, in the court's discretion."
At the trial of the traverses, "the court shall determine the community
assets and liabilities; the valuation of assets shall be determined at
the trial on the merits." 5 If it deems proper, the court is authorized
to appoint experts to "assist the court in the settlement of the com-
munity and partition of community property, including the classifica-
tion of assets as community or separate, the appraisal of community
assets, the settlement of the claims of the parties, and the allocation
of assets and liabilities to the parties."'"
If the purpose of the pretrial procedures set forth in the new
legislation is accomplished, the trial on the merits will be devoted
to the classification of items in dispute, their valuation, and the pro-
posed allocation of the assets. Valuation of the assets is to be deter-
mined as of the time of trial on the merits."
The court then shall divide the community assets and liabilities
so that each spouse receives property of equal net value.' 8 The
language is identical to that of article 2369.1, which was repealed.'9
The first priority in dividing the assets and liabilities is a partition
in kind, evidenced by the following language: "The court shall allocate
or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and
liabilities."' In allocating the assets and liabilities, the court has
authority to divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally,
or the court may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. In
deciding to whom an asset or liability shall be allocated, the court
"shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the
economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that
the court deems relevant."2' If the allocation results in an unequal
net distribution, the court shall order the payment of "an equalizing
13. "Upon the motion of either party, the court shall fix a time limit within which
each party shall either traverse or concur." Id.
14. "The court, in its discretion, may by ordinary procedure try and determine
at one hearing all issues, including those raised in the traverses." Id. The bifurcated
trial under paragraph 2 of LA. R.S. 9:2801 may not be necessary if the community prop-
erty consists of only a few items whose classification is not disputed.
15. Id. See CAL. [CIv.] CODE S 4800(a) (West Supp. 1982).
16. LA. R.S. 9:2801.
17. See text at note 15, supra.
18. La. R.S. 9:2801.
19. See note 3 supra.




sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon
such terms and conditions as the court shall direct."
2
Should the allocation of an asset in whole or in part be inequitable
to a spouse, the court has two options: (1) order the parties to draw
lots for the asset, 3 or (2) order a private sale of the asset "on such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper."" These two options
should be used only when neither husband nor wife has a more
meritorious claim to an item of community property. Otherwise, it
might be inequitable for the court to assign the asset to one spouse.
If the court orders a "drawing of lots," the unsuccessful party would
be entitled to other community property of equal value or an equaliz-
ing sum of money.
A partition by licitation should be ordered only in the event no
other alternative can be utilized. If a public sale is ordered, the court
has authority to fix minimum bids25 and "other terms and conditions."
However, if the court orders partition by licitation, it "shall express-
ly state the reasons why the asset cannot be allocated, assigned by
the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale."' Obviously, partition by
licitation is disfavored as a method for partitioning the community,
and under the system of priorities, it should be the method of last
resort.
The new legislation, as did Civil Code article 2369.1, permits the
court to allocate liabilities to a spouse; but it expressly provides that
as between the spouses, "the allocation of a liability to a spouse
obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. 217 Without the ex-
press creation of an obligation, the other spouse might have no remedy
to assert against the spouse who was allocated the liability and failed
22. Id. "The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents
as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either community or
separate property, movable or immovable, as security." See note 8, supra.
23. Although the possibility of ordering the spouses to draw lots may seem similar
to the "drawing of lots" provided for in Civil Code articles 1364-1367, see Note, supra
note 4, at 814, there is an important difference. Under the Civil Code procedure for
drawing lots, the lots are drawn for two groups of property of equal value. The new
legislation contemplates the drawing of lots for one asset.
24. LA. R.S. 9:2801. The terms and conditions which may be imposed by the court
include "the minimum price, the terms of sale, the execution of realtor listing
agreements, and the period of time during which the asset shall be offered for private
sale." Id.
25. See Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
In Note, supra note 4, at 813, the author opined: "The setting of a minimum price
for purchase at judicial sale serves to protect a spouse with inferior purchasing power,
particularly in cases where no third persons will be bidding on the item."
26. LA. R.S. 9:2801.
27. Id. Cf. CAL. [CIv.] CODE S 4800.6 (West Supp. 1982).
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to pay it. Should the spouse to whom the liability has been allocated
default, the creditor could seek satisfaction from former community
property allocated to the other spouse in the partition.' Since the
partition was not accomplished by contract between the spouses, the
theoretical basis of the right of the spouse whose property has been
seized to claim reimbursement would be unjust enrichment. 9 The
legislation's express imposition of a legal obligation relieves the spouse
of the necessity of proving the elements of recovery for unjust
enrichment.}
As to the rights of creditors, section 2801 provides: "The alloca-
tion [of liabilities] in no way affects the rights of creditors." The alloca-
tion of a liability to a spouse does not make him a debtor of the
creditor; it only makes the spouse responsible to the other spouse
for satisfaction of the allocated liability. In most instances, the judge
will allocate a liability to the debtor spouse. Absent a novation of
the debt," the creditor's rights will continue to be governed by arti-
cle 2357 of the Civil Code. Thus, a creditor of either spouse, regardless
of which spouse is allocated the liability in the partition, may con-
tinue to seize property of the former community allocated to both
spouses.32 Furthermore, if a spouse, not the debtor of a creditor,
disposes of assets of the former community other than for the satisfac-
tion of community obligations, 3  he becomes personally liable to the
creditor to the extent of the value of the property so disposed.34 A
spouse believing that by virtue of the judicial partition in kind he
can now freely dispose of property received discovers that by so do-
ing, he has assumed a personal liability which did not exist previous-
ly. The effect of a partition in kind under section 2801 as to preter-
mination creditors is the same as a voluntary partition by agreement
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1965.
30. There are today five conditions for enrichment without cause as a source of
obligation: (1) correlative impoverishment and enrichment, (2) absence of fault on
the part of the impoverishee, (3) absence of a personal interest on the part of
the impoverishee, (4) absence of cause, (5) absence of another action, which is ex-
plained by the subsidiary character of the action de in rem verso. J. DENSON
SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 418
(4th ed. 1973).
31. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2185-2198.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357, para. 1: "An obligation incurred by a spouse before or
during the community property regime, may be satisfied after termination of the regime
from the property of the former community and from the separate property of the
spouse who incurred the obligation."
33. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2360-2363.
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357, para. 2: "If a spouse disposes of property of the former
community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations, he is
liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that com-
munity property." See Note, supra note 4, at 789-99.
1982]
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of the spouses.35 The only protection afforded a spouse against the
continuing effect of article 2357 is to expressly assume responsibility
for one-half of the community obligations incurred by the other. 6
Thereafter, the assuming spouse may dispose of property received
in the partition without incurring further responsibility.'
Whether section 2801 may be applied to pending litigation depends
upon whether the provision is procedural or substantive. One pur-
pose of the new legislation is to provide a detailed procedure for par-
titioning community property. A priority of methods for partitioning
the community is also the subject matter of the new legislation; The
methods are specific guidelines for the implementation of article 2369.1,
enacted in 1981. Because of its history and purposes, it seems the
legislation is procedural and remedial and, as such, applicable to pend-
ing as well as future litigation.' Arguably, the only substantive change
made by the legislation is the imposition of an obligation owed to the
other spouse upon allocation of a community debt. Yet, an obligation
to reimburse the nondebtor spouse should his property be seized in
satisfaction of the debt allocated to the other spouse already existed
in the form of a claim of unjust enrichment. 9 Thus, the obligation
merely changed in character from a quasi-contractual obligation to one
imposed directly by law, effecting no substantive change.
To demonstrate the utility of the new partition legislation, con-
sider the circumstances in Franklin v. Franklin."' Husband and wife
had purchased immovable property, consisting of a lot and home, dur-
35. See Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifica-
tions of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 123-24 (1979); Note, supra
note 4, at 816.
36. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2357, para. 3: "A spouse may by written act assume respon-
sibility for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse. In
such case, the assuming spouse may dispose of community property without incurring
further responsibility for the obligations incurred by the other spouse."
37. However, by an express assumption the following occurs: the assuming spouse
(1) limits the responsibility of his share of former community property to one-half
of each community obligation of the other; (2) the separate property of the assuming
spouse also becomes responsible; and (3) separate creditors of the other spouse
may no longer seek satisfaction of their obligations from property of the assum-
ing spouse. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 35, at 130.
38. See genei-ally General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64
So. 2d 417 (1953); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So.
566 (1940); West v. State, Supt. of Public Educ. & State Bd. of Educ., 356 So. 2d 1015
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Hammond Asphalt Co. v. Joiner, 270 So. 2d 244 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1972); Pelloat v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n v. Palmer & Baker,
Inc., 175 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 248 La. 122, 176 So. 2d 452 (La.
1965).
39. See text at notes 29-30, supra.
40. 415 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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ing the marriage. After a legal separation, the husband remained in
possession of the house and lot, purchased the adjoining lot, and con-
structed an improvement of the existing house on both lots. The pur-
chase of the adjoining lot and the construction of the addition were
with separate funds of the husband. The property consisting of both
lots had an appraised value of $58,000; the original house and lot would
have had an appraised value of $16,500. Since it was stipulated that
the property which included both lots could not be partitioned in kind,
the court ordered the property to be sold at public auction for not
less than $40,000 cash.
The husband argued that the judge had erred in ordering his
separate property sold. According to the husband, only the original
value of the property should have been partitioned and that should
have been accomplished by reimbursement from the husband's
separate estate to the community. By adopting the approach suggested
by the husband, the necessity of a partition by licitation could have
been avoided.
Concluding that the positive law was silent concerning the parti-
tion of property that was in part separate and in part community,
the court relied on Civil Code article 21.1 "Natural law and reason"
required that the property, consisting of a house built on two lots
which could not be moved or returned to its original state without
substantial loss to both parties, be sold. As to the predicament of
the husband, the court commented: "Defendant cannot be heard to
complain, since the situation has resulted from his own actions. '4 2
Although the factual circumstances in the Franklin case may be
unusual, there is the possibility that a house constructed on separate
property of one spouse could be classified as community property.
Such a possibility was mentioned in a footnote in Deliberto v.
Deliberto.43 A house constructed with community funds on separate
41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 21: "In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an
appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive
law is silent."
42. 415 So. 2d at 428.
43. 400 So. 2d 1096, 1099 n.3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). See In re Marriage of Sparks,
97 Cal. App. 3d 353, 158 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1979), where the court awarded the wife com-
munity land and a house built with her separate funds on the land and awarded the
husband a credit for one-half the value of the land. See also Long v. Long, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 544, 548, 199 P.2d 47, 50 (1948) in which the court stated:
The plaintiff is in error in his contention ...to the effect that since the house
was built on his separate property it also became his separate property. Buildings
and improvements placed on separate property of a husband and paid for with
community funds do not become the separate property of the husband in the
absence of an agreement to that effect.
19821
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property of the husband was classified as separate with a right of
reimbursement accorded to the wife for the use of community funds."
However, in a footnote, the court indicated the result might have
been different had the operative facts arisen after January 1, 1980.
"LSA-CC Art. 491, as of January 1, 1980, would have permitted the
spouses to have established ownership of the family domicile separate
from the husband's land. 4
Under article 491 of the Civil Code, buildings46 permanently at-
tached to the ground may belong to a person other than the owner
of the ground. Such constructions are presumed to belong to the owner
of the ground unless separate ownership is evidenced by an instru-
ment filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which
the immovable is located. Furthermore, article 493 of the Civil Code
provides that buildings made on the land of another with his consent
belong to him who made them. In most cases involving the construc-
tion of a community home on separate property of a spouse, the owner
of the immovable will have consented to the construction. Those who
made the construction on land belonging to another are the husband
and wife, as coowners of community property 7 used to fund the con-
struction.
A question remaining under the new articles on ownership is the
effect of failing to record an instrument under article 491 evidencing
ownership of the house as community. Failure to record such an in-
strument should not preclude establishing community ownership of
the house for two reasons: (1) registry is intended to establish owner-
ship as to third persons," not as between the parties, which is consis-
44. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1). See LA.
CiV. CODE art. 2366, quoted in Deliberto, 400 So. 2d at 1099 n.3.
45. 400 So. 2d at 1099 n.3.
46. Buildings should not be considered "component parts" of an immovable because
they are treated separately in article 491 and the first paragraph of article 493 of
the Civil Code. Article 493 reads as follows:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plant-
ings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made them.
They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without his consent.
Things incorporated in, or attached to, an immovable so as to become its com-
ponent parts under Articles 465 and 466 belong to the owner of the immovable.
One who lost the ownership of a thing to the owner of an immovable may have
a claim against him or against a third person in accordance with the following
provisions.
47. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336.
48. LA. CiV. CODE art. 491:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber,
and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees may belong to a person other
than the owner of the ground. Nevertheless, they are presumed to belong to the
owner of the ground, unless separate ownership is evidenced by an instrument
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tent with registry requirements generally,49 and (2) registry simply
displaces the presumption of article 491 that buildings constructed on
an immovable belong to the owner of the ground, rather than pro-
hibiting its rebuttal.
If a house may be classified as community property and the im-
movable property on which it is located as separate, the problem of
partitioning the house arises. The dilemma is novel because past
jurisprudence has treated such a factual situation under the law of
accession, the result being that the house was classified as separate
property with a right of reimbursement accorded to the other spouse
for the use of community funds.'
Rather than order a partition by licitation as in the Franklin case,
the court could partition the community property in kind by allocating
the house to the spouse upon whose separate property it is located.
In allocating a particular community asset under section 2801, the
court is to consider all circumstances that it deems relevant. That
the house is constructed on the husband's separate property is rele-
vant. If the house is allocated to the husband, the wife must receive
equal net value by the allocation of other community property with
the same aggregate value as the house (assuming there are other com-
munity assets of sufficient value), by ordering the husband to pay
an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred (requiring the
execution of a note, possibly secured by a mortgage on the house and
lot), or by allocating to the husband more community debts. The lat-
ter alternative is the least desirable since the allocation has no effect
on creditors' rights and may not have the practical result of assuring
the wife's receipt of equal net value.
With problems such as those presented by the Franklin case and
the application of Civil Code article 491, the detailed procedure and
priorities of the new legislation may serve to protect spouses from
the sometimes harsh economic alternative of a partition by licitation.
It is hoped that judges will utilize the new legislation to accomplish
a just and equitable result in such cases.
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable
is located.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 491, comment (c):
Separate ownership of buildings, of other constructions permanently attached to
the ground, of standing timber, and of unharvested crops or ungathered fruits
of trees may be asserted toward third persons only if it is evidenced by an instru-
ment filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the im-
movable is located. In the absence of such an instrument, third persons are en-
titled to assume that these things are component parts of the ground.
(emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2246, 2265, 2266, 2332; LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950).
50. See Succession of Spann, 407 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Richard v.
Richard, 383 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2366.
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